Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

2009

State of Utah v. Branson Parduhn : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Laura B. Dupaix; assistant attorney general; Mark L. Shurtleff; attorney general; Marc Mathis;
counsel for appellee.
Jonathon W. Gimes, Edward D. Flint; Sean Hullinger; Flint, Grimes & Hullinger; counsel for
appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Parduhn, No. 20090744.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2009).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/2968

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

Case No. 2*90744-SC

SUPREME tOURT OF UTAH
STATE||F UTAH,
PlaintiflAppellee,

BRANS*
Defendalflt/Appellant.
Brief | f Appellant
Appeal from an interlocutory o
In Re Expenses of Defense Rep)
Hansen, Third Judicial District
Defendant is not incarcerated ij
Anders brief.
Laura B. Dupaix (5195)
Assistant Attorney General
Mark L.Shurtleff (4666)
Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-085'
Telephone: (801) 366-0180

|er denying Defendant's Motion For Order
Mentation, entered by the Honorable Royal
>urt, Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
connection with this case. This is not an

Jonathon W. Grimes (10462)
Edward D.Flint (4573)
Sean Hullinger (9264)
FLINT, GRIMES & HULLINGER
455 East 400 South
Suite 100
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801)363-5297

Marc Mathis
Deputy Salt Lake District Attcf
Counsel for Appellee

Counsel for Appellant

Case No. 20«/;u, H ^C

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
BRANSON PARDUHN
Defendant/Appellant.
Briel olAppdlunl
Appeal from an interlocutory order denying Defendant's Motion For Order
In Re Expenses of Defense Representation, entered by the Honorable Royal
Hansen, Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
Defendant is not incarcerated in connection with this case. This is not an
Anders brief.
Laura B. Dupaix (5195)
Assistant Attorney General
Mark L.Shurtleff (4666)
Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6,h Floor
;'.U. iiux 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854
Telephone: (801) 366-0180
Marc Mathis
Deputy Salt T m.c

Jonathon W. Grimes v i UHU-J
Edward D. Flint (4573)
Sean Hullinger (9264)
FLINT, GRIMES & HULLINGER
455 East 400 South
Suite 100
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801)363-5297

Altome>
Counsel for Appellant

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE

OF

AUTHORITIES

iii

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

1

STANDARD OF REVIEW

2

PRESERVATION OF ISSUE

2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

3

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

5

ARGUMENT

6

BRANSEN PARDUHN HAS A RIGHT TO COUNSEL OF
HIS CHOICE

6

THE UTAH STATE LEGISLATURE DID NOT OVERTURN
STATE V.BURNS

9

Salt Lake County's Contract With LDA Has No Provision for
Defense Resources

12

The Existence of a Contract for Defense Resources Does
Not Deprive Indigent Defendants of Access to Counsel of
Their Choice Or Defense Resources

14

I

DENYING INDIGENT DEFENDANTS DEFENSE RESOURCES
WOULD UNDERMINE PRO BONO REPRESENTATION
BY PRIVATE ATTORNEYS

Conclusion

16

17

ADDENDUM OF STATUTES AND RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

11

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985)

7

Caplin & Drysdale, Charteredv. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989)

6

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)

.passim

Lewis v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 523 F.3d 1272 (10th Cir.2008)..../*zs,.s7m
State v. Bakalov, 1999UT45, 979 P.2d799

15

State v. Barber, 2009 UT App. 91, 206 P.3d 1223
State v. Burns, 2000 UT 56, 4 P.3d 795

6
2,5,7,9,10,11,14,15

United States v. Collins, 920 F.2d 619 (10th Cir.1990)

6

United States v. Gallop, 838 F.2d 105 (4th Cir. 1998)

7

United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 144(2006)
Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153(1988)

U.S. Constitution, Amendment VI

6
6

6

Utah Code Ann. §76-6-405: Theft By Deception, a 3rd degree felony

1,3

Utah Code Ann. §76-6-501: Forgery, a 3rd degree felony

1,3

Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-101 etseq. Utah Indigent Defense Act
Utah Code Ann. § 78a-3-102(3)(b)

7,8,9,10,12,13
1

iii

County Contract #SG04012C, December 28, 2004:
The Agreement For Services

4,12,13

Senate Floor Debate Audio Recording for Senate Bill 154 on 2/12/2001
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct

11
16,17

iv

Case No. 20090744 - SC

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
BRANSON PARDUHN
Defendant/Appellant.
Brief of Appellant

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant is awaiting trial for Forgery, a 3rd degree felony in violation
of U.C.A. §76-6-501 and two counts Theft By Deception, a 3rd degree felony, in
violation of U.C.A. §76-6-405. He appeals from an interlocutory order denying his
motion for a hand-writing expert to be appointed and paid for by Salt Lake County.
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann 78A-3-102(3)(b).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
ISSUE # 1; Did the trial court err in denying Defendant's motion
requesting the county pay for the expert fees for a handwriting expert in the
defense of his case?
1

STANDARD OF REVIEW:

"The question of whether a trial court can

require a defendant to accept LDA counsel in order to qualify for other statefunded assistance is a matter of statutory interpretation, and we review a trial
court's statutory interpretation for correctness." State v. Burns, 2000 UT 56, f 15,
4P.3d795.
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE
This issue was originally raised by Defendant's Motion For Order In Re
Expenses of Defense Representation filed on April 02, 2009 (R. 46-48). An order
denying Defendant's Motion was entered on August 26, 2009 (R. 120-122).
Defendant's Petition for Permission to Appeal Interlocutory Order was
subsequently filed on September 15, 2009. (R. 124-128).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following determinative provisions are attached as Addendum A:
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AMENDMENT VI;
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-32-101;
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-32-301;
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-32-302;
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-32-303;
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-405;
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-501;
UTAHRULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT #'s 1.1, 1.3, 1.16, 3.2, 6.1,
6.2

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defendant was originally charged with five counts of the offense of
Forgery, a 3rd degree felony, in violation of U.C.A. §76-6-501 and two counts Theft
By Deception, a 3rd degree felony, in violation of U.C.A. §76-6-405 by information
dated September 4, 2007 (R. 1-5). On Dec 16, 2008, Judge Terry Christiansen
found the Defendant indigent and appointed the Legal Defenders Association
("LDA") to represent him (R. 11). Present counsel was retained a short time
thereafter by a one-time monetary gift from Defendant's grandparents and
appeared on December 30, 2008 (R. 15). On April 2, 2009, the Defendant filed a
Motion for Order in Re Expenses of Defense Representation (R. 46). On April 16,
2009, the court granted the motion, finding that Defendant's incarceration for the
previous four months meant that he was still indigent. Based upon his indigence,
he was entitled to incur up to $1,500.00 in expenses to retain a handwriting analyst
to help determine whether the articles were indeed forgeries, and if so, whether
they had been forged by Defendant (R. 53). On April 21, the State filed a
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Order in Re Expenses of
Defense Representation (R. 56-66).
On August 25th, 2009, Judge Hansen signed his Finding of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and Order which: A) Reaffirmed Defendant's indigence; B)
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denied the defense's request for funds; C) reappointed LDA "to provide
representation and defense resources"; and D) declared that Salt Lake County has
no obligation or duty to pay the defense costs for a handwriting analyst.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On September 6, 2007 the State of Utah filed an information alleging that
Branson Parduhn had committed five counts of Forgery and two counts of Theft
By Deception, all 3 rd Degree Felonies (R. 1-5). Mr. Parduhn, on March 24, 2009
entered not guilty pleas to all counts and still enjoys the presumption of innocence
(R. at 41).

Subsequent to entering his not guilty plea, Mr. Parduhn, through

counsel, requested that the State provide funds to hire a handwriting analyst to
examine the instruments he allegedly forged (R. 46). While the District Court has
repeatedly found Mr. Parduhn to be indigent1, his request for funds was ultimately
denied. The Agreement For Services (County Contract #SG04012C, December 28,
2004), between Salt Lake County and Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association
("LDA"), does not contain any specific provision for defense resources separate
from defense attorneys. (R. 69-81).

1 Judge Terry Christiansen first declared Mr. Parduhn indigent on December 16, 2008
and appointed LDA (R. 11). Judge Royal Hansen reappointed LDA on May 28, 2009
(R. 92). Mr. Parduhn was again found to be indigent on June 11, 2009 and LDA was
appointed again (R. 95). He was found indigent for the fourth and final time on
August 26, 2009 (R. 120-121). He is currently incarcerated on unrelated matters.
4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Sixth Amendment requires all indigent defendants to be provided advice
of counsel. This Court held in State v. Burns, that the right to counsel includes the
effective assistance of counsel, an essential part of which is the help of the experts
which are used by defense counsel as the tools by which a defense is constructed.
The Utah Indigent Defense Act (the Act) codifies the Constitutional guarantee, and
provides a statutory scheme whereby Counties can discharge their obligation to
provide indigent defendants with legal counsel and defense resources, and whereby
they may find some reasonable measure of fiscal protection from the unlimited
liability imposed by the right. Salt Lake County has attempted to take advantage
of the Act by entering into a contract with Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association
(LDA). its contract, however, is insufficient to meet the requirements of the Act.
The County also argues that receipt of defense resources is conditioned on
acceptance of LDA attorneys. Their argument is directly refuted by the text of the
Act, is unsupported by the legislative history of the Act, and attempts to reinterpret State v. Burns in a manner that would serve to deprive, rather than protect
indigent defendant's rights to Due Process and meaningful advice of counsel by
unreasonably narrowing the resources provided, and severely discouraging
alternative representation by pro bono private counsel.

5

ARGUMENT
I.

Bransen Parduhn Has a Right to Counsel of His Choice, and Separate
and Distinct Rights - as an Indigent Defendant - to State Appointed
Legal Counsel and/or Defense Resources.
The Sixth Amendment provides that, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the

accused shall enjoy the right... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense."
U.S. Const. Amend VI. a[T]he Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right
to be represented by an otherwise qualified attorney whom that defendant can
afford to hire, or who is willing to represent the defendant even though he is
without funds." Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 62625 (1989). The right to select counsel of one's choice has never been derived
from the Sixth Amendment's purpose of ensuring a fair trial; it has been regarded
as the root meaning of the constitutional guarantee. See Wheat v. United States,
486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988). As the Utah Court of Appeals noted in State v. Barber,
2009 UT App 91; 206 P.3d 1223, an element of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel is the right of a defendant who does not require appointed counsel to
choose who will represent him. Id. at Tf 41. (citing United States v. GonzalezLopez, 548 U.S. 140, 144 (2006)); see also United States v. Collins, 920 F.2d 619,
625 (10th Cir.1990) CAttorneys are not fungible; often the most important decision
a defendant makes in shaping his defense is his selection of an attorney." (internal
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quotation marks omitted)), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized
by Lewis v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 523 F.3d 1272 (10th Cir.2008).
As stated above, criminal defendants enjoy a broad right to counsel of their
choice. This right, however, is not without limit and is much more circumscribed
when a defendant requires appointed counsel. "An indigent defendant... has no
right to have a particular lawyer represent him and can demand a different
appointed lawyer only with good cause." United States v. Gallop, 838 F.2d 105,
108 (4th Cir.1988). While an indigent defendant's right to counsel of choice is
more circumscribed than those of an individual who can pay or persuade an
attorney to assist him, in all criminal cases the constitutionally guaranteed right to
counsel also includes a separate and co-equal right to be provided with the
resources necessary to prepare and present a complete and effective defense. See
Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1985).
As this Court noted in State v. Burns, this right to counsel is applicable to
the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. Burns, 2000 UT 56, \ 22 (citing Gideon
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,339-345(1963). In order to discharge its
constitutional duties, the State of Utah implemented the Utah Indigent Defense
Act. Utah Code Ann. §77-32-101 etseq. ("The Act"). At the time of Parduhn's
motion to appoint an expert witness, the Act provided the following minimum

7

standards for defense of an indigent:
Each county, city, and town shall provide for the defense of an indigent in
criminal cases in the courts and various administrative bodies of the state in
accordance with the following minimum standards:
(1) provide counsel for each indigent who faces the substantial
probability of
the deprivation of the indigent's liberty;
(2) afford timely representation by competent legal counsel;
(3) provide the investigatory resources necessary for a complete defense;
(4) assure undivided loyalty of defense counsel to the client;
(5) proceed with a first appeal of right; and
(6) prosecute other remedies before or after a conviction, considered by
defense counsel to be in the interest of justice except for other and
subsequent discretionary appeals or discretionary writ proceedings.
§77-32-301.
Conspicuously absent from the requirement to provide an adequate defense
is any sort of limitation or restraint upon the general duty imposed upon the state.
In Section 302 of the Act, the legislature elucidates clearly the state's burden to
provide both legal counsel and/or "defense resources necessary for an effective
defense." Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-302(1). Subsection 302(l)(a), clearly states the
separate duties of providing counsel and resources; and states with equal clarity the
fact that an indigent individual may request "counsel or defense resources or both"
(emphasis added). Thus legal assistance and defense resources are two separate
but inherent elements of the state's constitutional duty to provide counsel to the
indigent criminal defendant.
In this case, there is no dispute as to whether Mr. Parduhn is indigent2.
2 See supra note 1
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Because he has been charged with several felony offenses, which carry with them
"a substantial probability that the penalty to be imposed is confinement in either
jail or prison", (Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-302(1)) he is statutorily entitled to legal
counsel, defense resources, or both upon his request. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-32302(l)(a). Under the plain language of the statute, Mr. Parduhn is under no
obligation to request any of these services, nor is he required to request one if he
requests the other. In fact, § 77-32-302(1 )(b), states that once is has been
determined that the indigent defendant qualifies (by his indigence) for assistance,
the only way the state can be relieved of its burden is for a defendant to
"affirmatively waive or reject on the record the opportunity to be represented and
provided defense resources." Waiving only one of these prongs can not relieve the
state of its duty to provide the other. Because Mr. Parduhn has not "affirmatively"
and "on the record" waived his right to "be represented and provided defense
resources", the state has not been relieved of its duty to provide them.
II.

The Utah State Legislature Neither Attempted Nor Achieved
Overturning of This Court's Ruling in State v. Burns.
The issue of whether an individual must needs forgo his counsel of choice in

order to obtain expert assistance has been succinctly and authoritatively decided by
this Court in State v. Burns, 2000 UT 56. In Burns, the Defendant's father had
retained private counsel on behalf of his daughter, and the State sought to prevent
9

her access to state-funded expert assistance. However, this Court held that where
indigence and necessity are both shown, a defendant is entitled to expert witness
funding. Id. at \ 28. In its Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion For
Order In Re Expenses of Defense Representation, Salt Lake County argues that the
Utah Legislature overturned Burns in 2001. This position significantly overstates
the effect of the changes made to the Act.
The changes made by the 2001 legislature essentially add the phrase,
"defense resources" to the clauses contained in §§ 77-32-302 (1), (2)(a) and (2)(b).
Looking to the plain language of the statute, this change was little more than a
clarification that the counties have a duty to provide defense counsel and defense
resources; and a county can satisfy its duty to provide defense resources through
contracting with defense experts directly, or by allowing a legal aid association to
sub-contract for defense experts and like resources. The additional language in
§ 77-32-302(1 )(a) was written in the disjunctive. An indigent may request
"counsel OR defense resources OR both" (emphasis added).
The apparent concern of the legislature was that, post-Burns, the State would
have to pay exorbitant costs to fly in internationally renowned experts from the
four corners of the globe to testify on behalf of an indigent defendant when
competent local authorities were available to satisfy the legal need. In an effort to
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prevent this, but while recognizing the indigent defendant's right to have defense
resources provided, the legislature attempted to implement a scheme to control
costs. Senator Hillyard, introducing the bill on behalf of bill-sponsor Senator
Gladwell, elucidated this intent as follows:
The problem gets to be, a person may have some money so he can
hire an attorney but doesn't have the money to buy the experts he needs for
trial and that's been kind the problem the courts have dealt with. A recent
Utah Supreme Court case came back and said if his money is all gone
spending for the lawyer, then he is appointed the experts that he needs for
his case and so these bills have been coming in and really hampering the
counties. What this bill basically says is we acknowledge that right, but to
use an expert you will have to take it off the panel that the court-appointed
attorney uses all the time. They have a contract with the county, you then
have these experts that they could use. They are good qualified experts, but
there is a contract limiting what they can charge on the fees and what the
county has to pay and think it makes sense to give the defendant the rights
he needs but still have some protection for the county so they don't go out
and hire some expert from New York and bring them in and pay him
whatever charges he may have.

See Senate Floor Debate Audio Recording for Senate Bill 154 on 2/12/2001 \
Far from attempting to overturn Bums, this Bill explicitly acknowledges
Burns and provides a means whereby if the counties and cities comply with the
plain language of the statute, they would have some measure of fiscal protection
from the unlimited obligation imposed on them by Due Process and §§ 77-32-301302(1).
3 Available at hUp://\vw\vJetstale.ut.us/asp/audio/index.asp?Sess-2001GS&Bill-SB0154&Day-Q&House~S
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A.

Because Salt Lake County's Contract With LDA Has No
Provision for Defense Resources, the Protections Included in the
Indigent Defense Act do not Apply.

Salt Lake County's claim that Mr. Parduhn must use a defense resource
contracted for by the Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association ("LDA") is precluded
by the fact that LDA has no such contract for expert assistance. Section 77-32302(2)(b) provides that a county or municipality may contract with a legal aid
association to provide for both legal defense resources and counsel. Section 77-32302(c) also provides that the county can directly contract with defense resources
and provide notice of such contract to a court. If the county does either of those
two things, then the Act requires that an indigent defendant seeking appointment,
first attempt to draw from this pool of contracting or sub-contracting resources, if
they are available, while preparing his defense. It is only in this circumstance that
the provisions of § 77-32-303 of the Act come into play. Section 303 of the Act
provides:
If a county or municipality has contracted for, or otherwise made
arrangements for, the legal defense of indigents, including a competent
attorney and defense resources, the court may not appoint a noncontracting
attorney or resource either under this part, Section 78B-1-151, or Rule 15,
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, unless the court:
(1) conducts a hearing with proper notice to the responsible entity to
consider the authorization or designation of a noncontract attorney or
resource; and
(2) makes a finding that there is a compelling reason to authorize or
designate a noncontracting attorney or resources for the indigent defendant.
12

Again, the plain language of the statute indicates that if the county has
contracted specifically for defense resources and/or competent attorneys, only then
must a defendant show a compelling reason to have the county pay for an expert or
lawyer that is not already otherwise available as part of the county contract.
In this case, § 303's requirement of showing a compelling reason does not
come into play for several reasons: 1) Mr. Parduhn does not wish to have the court
appoint, nor the county pay for, a lawyer; 2) He would happily utilize a contracted
handwriting expert; however, 3) The county has no contract with such an expert,
LDA has no such contract, nor does Salt Lake County have a contract with LDA to
provide such.
As part of its memorandum opposing Mr. Parduhn's request for an expert,
Salt Lake County provided a copy of its contract with the Salt Lake Legal
Defenders Association (R. 69-88). This contract makes no provision for "defense
resources". As a consequence, the County is without the protections offered in §
302 or § 303 and is therefor subject to the full burden imposed by Due Process and
§301 of the Act.

13

B.

The Existence of a Contract for Defense Resources Can Not Be
Used to Deprive Indigent Defendants of Access to Counsel of
Their Choice Or Defense Resources.

Assuming, arguendo, that the necessary provisions were included in the
contract, the State would still be prevented by the plain language of the statute
from asserting that the right to government funded defense resources were
conditioned upon acceptance of LDA counsel. The state argues that the intent of
the 2001 legislative changes to the statute was to force an indigent defendant to
accept LDA as his legal counsel, and use LDA's sub-contracted board of experts
for his defense resources. Further, if a Defendant had the temerity to relieve the
County of part of its burden by obtaining counsel or expert advice on his own, the
County's position would be that he may not do that, lest he forgo all other
assistance.
Even if this strained reading of the statute were accurate, the fact that there is
no indication that a sub-contracted board of experts even exists prohibits the state
from denying any indigent defendant his constitutionally guaranteed defense
resources. Additionally, such a position would be inconsistent with the position
taken by the State in other cases where the State has taken the position that "an
indigent defendant proceeding pro se who has declined standby counsel from the
LDA would be able to acquire funding for expert assistance." State v. Burns, 2000

14

UT, f 30, 4 P.3d 795 citing State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, f 9, 35, 979 R2d 799.
In reality, there is no conflict between Burns and the Act. State v. Burns
merely articulated the two duties inherent to the right of Due Process that were
endorsed and codified by the legislature, which also provided a simple-to-complywith scheme permitting the counties to exert some degree of reasonable control
over the otherwise limitless potential costs of fulfilling their duties.
While Mr. Parduhn concedes that it is reasonable for the County, through the
Act, to prevent an indigent defendant from abusing the resources of the county by
asserting exorbitant demands for superstar lawyers and globetrotting experts on the
county's dime, it is not reasonable for a county to attempt to use the Act to prevent
an indigent Defendant from obtaining whatever expert or lawyer he is able to
obtain through his own endeavors. The County's attempt to use the Indigent
Defense Act as a sword to deprive an indigent defendant of the rights protected by
the Act flies directly in the face of the obvious purpose of the statute to be a shield
for those who do not have the means to otherwise prevent the juggernaut of the
State from crushing them without pause, or care.

15

III.

Denying Indigent Defendants Defense Resources Would
Catastrophically Undermine Pro Bono Representation by Private
Attorneys In Utah.

Finally, should the county's position be adopted, the private defense bar
would face a profound, if not fatal, disincentive from providing pro bono or
reduced fee legal services in our communities. Accepting a case without being
able access the Constitutionally mandated defense resources to defend an indigent
client would necessarily catch pro bono defense counsel between the Scylla and
Charybdis of taking upon themselves the unlimited obligation discussed, supra, to
fund such resources, or running afoul of, inter alia, the following canons of
professional responsibility:
-

The requirement of reasonable thoroughness and preparation. (URPC

— The mandated diligence and promptness in the face of the personal
burden on pro bono counsel in representing a client. (URPC 1.3, See
comment 1.)
-

The heightened impetus to withdraw because of unreasonable financial
burden. (URPC 1.16(b)(6))

— The implicit incentive to delay litigation in order to amortize pro bono
counsel's financial loss by delaying the case. (URPC 3.2, see comment 1.)
16

Such a scheme would provide a blanket justification for all but the richest
attorneys to avoid appointments by the court due to the likelihood of an
unreasonable financial burden (URPC 6.2(b). It would also almost entirely defeat
the aspirational goal of provision of pro bono services in Rule 6.1 by any means
other than the $10 per hour donation. (URPC 6.1(c).
CONCLUSION
In this case, Bransen Parduhn seeks for a ruling reaffirming this Court's
holding in Burns, that the right to legal counsel and the right to defense resources
are two distinct, constitutionally mandated rights of indigent defendants. Further,
this Court should order that unless a defendant waives his right to both counsel and
defense resources affirmatively and on the record, his waiver of one of these rights
can not be construed as a waiver of the other. Finally, Mr. Parduhn respectfully
requests that this Court hold that the District Court's denial of his motion for
defense resources was in error and should be reversed; and instruct the District
Court to order Salt Lake County to provide the resources necessary to prepare his
defense.

nathon WKjrimes
Attorneyror Defendant
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ADDENDUM

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law,
and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with
the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in
his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
The Constitution of the United States, Amendment VI, 1791.

76-6-405. Theft by deception
(1)A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises control over property of
another by deception and with a purpose to deprive him thereof.
(2)Theft by deception does not occur, however, when there is only falsity as to
matters having no pecuniary significance, or puffing by statements unlikely to
deceive ordinary persons in the group addressed. "Puffing" means an exaggerated
commendation of wares or worth in communications addressed to the public or to a
class or group.
Utah Code
Title 76 Utah Criminal Code

76-6-501. Forgery- "Writing" defined
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or with
knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he:
(a)alters any writing of another without his authority or utters any such
altered writing; or
(b) makes, completes, eecutes, authenticates, issues, transfers, publishes, or
utters any writing so that the writing or the making, completion, execution,
authentication, issuance, transference, publication or utterance purports to be the
act of another, whether the person is existent or nonexistent, or purports to have
been executed at a time or place or in a numbered sequence other than was in fact
the case, or to be a copy of an original when no such original existed.
(2) As used in this section, "writing" includes printing, electronic storage or
transmission, or any other method of recording valuable information including
forms such as:
(a) checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, trademarks, money,
and any other symbols of value, right, privilege, or identification;
(b) a security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument or writing issued by a
government or any agency; or
(c) a check, an issue of stocks, bonds, or any other instrument or writing
representing an interest in or claim against property, or a pecuniary interest in or
claim against any person or enterprise.
(d) Forgery is a felony of the third degree.
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77-32-101. Indigent Defense Act.
This chapter is known as the "Indigent Defense Act."
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77-32-301. Minimum standards for defense of an indigent.
Each county, city, and town shall provide for the defense of an indigent in criminal
cases in the courts and various administrative bodies of the state in accordance
with the following minimum standards:
(1) provide counsel for each indigent who faces the substantial probability of
the deprivation of the indigent's liberty;
(2) afford timely representation by competent legal counsel;
(3) provide the investigatory resources necessary for a complete defense;
(4) assure undivided loyalty of defense counsel to the client;
(5) proceed with a first appeal of right; and
(6) prosecute other remedies before or after a conviction, considered by
defense counsel to be in the interest of justice except for other and subsequent
discretionary appeals or discretionary writ proceedings.
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 354, 1997 General Session
Utah Code
Title 77 Utah Code of Criminal Procedure

77-32-302. Assignment of counsel on request of indigent or order of court.
(1) Legal counsel shall be assigned to represent each indigent and the indigent
shall also be provided access to defense resources necessary for an effective
defense, if the indigent is under arrest for or charged with a crime in which there is
a substantial probability that the penalty to be imposed is confinement in either jail
or prison if:
(a) the indigent requests counsel or defense resources, or both; or
(b) the court on its own motion or otherwise orders counsel, defense
resources, or both and the defendant does not affirmatively waive or reject on the
record the opportunity to be represented and provided defense resources.
(2) (a) If a county responsible for providing indigent legal defense, including
counsel and defense resources, has established a county legal defender's office and
the court has received notice of the establishment of the office, the court shall
assign to the county legal defender's office the responsibility to defend indigent
defendants within the county and provide defense resources.
(b) If the county or municipality responsible to provide for the legal defense
of an indigent, including defense resources and counsel, has arranged by contract
to provide those services through a legal aid association, and the court has received
notice or a copy of the contract, the court shall assign the legal aid association
named in the contract to defend the indigent and provide defense resources.
(c) If the county or municipality responsible for providing indigent legal
defense, including counsel and defense resources, has contracted to provide those
services through individual attorneys, individual defense resources, or associations
providing defense resources, and the court has received notice or a copy of the
contracts, the court shall assign a contracting attorney as the legal counsel to
represent an indigent and a contracted defense resource to provide defense-related
services.
(d) If no county legal defender's office exists, the court shall select and
assign an attorney or defense resource if:
(i) the contract for indigent legal services is with multiple attorneys or
resources; or
(ii) the contract is with another attorney in the event of a conflict of
interest.
(e) If the court considers the assignment of a noncontracting attorney or
defense resource to provide legal services to an indigent defendant despite the
existence of an indigent legal services contract and the court has a copy or notice

of the contract, before the court may make the assignment, it shall:
(i) set the matter for a hearing;
(ii) give proper notice of the hearing to the attorney of the responsible
county or municipality; and
(iii) make findings that there is a compelling reason to appoint a
noncontracting attorney or defense resource.
(f) The indigent's preference for other counsel or defense resources may not
be considered a compelling reason justifying the appointment of a noncontracting
attorney or defense resource.
(3) The court may make a determination of indigency at any time.
Amended by Chapter 49, 2006 General Session
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77-32-303. Standard for court to appoint noncontracting attorney or defense
resource — Hearing.
If a county or municipality has contracted for, or otherwise made
arrangements for, the legal defense of indigents, including a competent attorney
and defense resources, the court may not appoint a noncontracting attorney or
resource either under this part, Section 78B-1-151, or Rule 15, Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure, unless the court:
(1) conducts a hearing with proper notice to the responsible entity to consider
the authorization or designation of a noncontract attorney or resource; and
(2) makes a finding that there is a compelling reason to authorize or designate a
noncontracting attorney or resources for the indigent defendant.
Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session.
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Rule 1.1. Competence.
A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent
representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation
reasonably necessary for the representation.
Rule 1.3. Diligence.
A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a
client.
Comment
...[3] Perhaps no professional shortcoming is more widely resented than
procrastination. A client's interests often can be adversely affected by the passage
of time or the change of conditions; in extreme instances, as when a lawyer
overlooks a statute of limitations, the client's legal position may be destroyed. Even
when the client's interests are not affected in substance, however, unreasonable
delay can cause a client needless anxiety and undermine confidence in the lawyer's
trustworthiness. A lawyer's duty to act with reasonable promptness, however, does
not preclude the lawyer from agreeing to a reasonable request for a postponement
that will not prejudice the lawyer's client.
Rule 1.16. Declining or terminating representation.
(b) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer may withdraw from representing a
client if:
...(b)(6) the representation will result in an unreasonable financial burden on the
lawyer or as been rendered unreasonably difficult by the client; ...

Rule 3.2. Expediting Litigation.
A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the
interests of the client.
Comment
[1] Dilatory practices bring the administration of justice into disrepute. Although
there will be occasions when a lawyer may properly seek a postponement for
personal reasons, it is not proper for a lawyer to routinely fail to expedite litigation
solely for the convenience of the advocates. Nor will a failure to expedite be
reasonable if done for the purpose of frustrating an opposing party's attempt to
obtain rightful redress or repose. The standard is whether a competent lawyer
acting in good faith would regard the course of action as having some substantial
purpose other than delay. Realizing financial or other benefit from otherwise
improper delay in litigation is not a legitimate interest of the client.

Rule 6.1. Voluntary Pro Bono Legal Service.
Every lawyer has a professional responsibility to provide legal services to those
unable to pay. A lawyer should aspire to render at least 50 hours of pro bono
publico legal services per year. In fulfilling this responsibility, the lawyer should:
...(c) A lawyer may also discharge the responsibility to provide pro bono publico
legal services by making an annual contribution of at least $10 per hour for each
hour not provided under paragraph (a) or (b) above to an agency that provides
direct services as defined in paragraph (a) above.

Rule 6.2. Accepting Appointments.
A lawyer shall not seek to avoid appointment by a tribunal to represent a person
except for good cause, such as:
...(b) Representing the client is likely to result in an unreasonable financial burden
on the lawyer; or

Excerpts from Judicial Council Rules of Judicial Administration, Chapter 13,
Rules of Professional Conduct

Rule 1.1. Competence.
A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation
requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary
for the representation.
Rule 1.3. Diligence.
A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.
Comment
...[3] Perhaps no professional shortcoming is more widely resented than procrastination.
A client's interests often can be adversely affected by the passage of time or the change
of conditions; in extreme instances, as when a lawyer overlooks a statute of limitations,
the client's legal position may be destroyed. Even when the client's interests are not
affected in substance, however, unreasonable delay can cause a client needless anxiety
and undermine confidence in the lawyer's trustworthiness. A lawyer's duty to act with
reasonable promptness, however, does not preclude the lawyer from agreeing to a
reasonable request for a postponement that will not prejudice the lawyer's client.
Rule 1.14. Client with Diminished Capacity.
...(b) When the lawyer reasonably believes that the client has diminished capacity, is at
risk of substantial physical, financial or other harm unless action is taken and cannot
adequately act in the client's own interest, the lawyer may take reasonably necessary
protective action, including consulting with individuals or entities that have the ability to
take action to protect the client and, in appropriate cases, seeking the appointment of a
guardian ad litem, conservator or guardian.

Rule 1.16. Declining or terminating representation.
(b) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer may withdraw from representing a client
if:
...(b)(6) the representation will result in an unreasonable financial burden on the lawyer
or as been rendered unreasonably difficult by the client;...

Rule 3.2. Expediting Litigation.
A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests
of the client.
Comment
[1] Dilatory practices bring the administration of justice into disrepute. Although there
will be occasions when a lawyer may properly seek a postponement for personal
reasons, it is not proper for a lawyer to routinely fail to expedite litigation solely for the
convenience of the advocates. Nor will a failure to expedite be reasonable if done for the
purpose of frustrating an opposing party's attempt to obtain rightful redress or repose.
The standard is whether a competent lawyer acting in good faith would regard the course
of action as having some substantial purpose other than delay. Realizing financial or
other benefit from otherwise improper delay in litigation is not a legitimate interest of
the client.

Rule 6.1. Voluntary Pro Bono Legal Service.
Every lawyer has a professional responsibility to provide legal services to those unable
to pay. A lawyer should aspire to render at least 50 hours of pro bono publico legal
services per year. In fulfilling this responsibility, the lawyer should:
...(c) A lawyer may also discharge the responsibility to provide pro bono publico legal
services by making an annual contribution of at least $10 per hour for each hour not
provided under paragraph (a) or (b) above to an agency that provides direct services as
defined in paragraph (a) above.

Rule 6.2. Accepting Appointments.
A lawyer shall not seek to avoid appointment by a tribunal to represent a person except
for good cause, such as:
...(b) Representing the client is likely to result in an unreasonable financial burden on the
lawyer; or
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